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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 001882

SIPDIS

DOD FOR OSD/APSA -
GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/HILL/BASALLA/ARAKEL IAN
JOINT STAFF FOR J5 - MILLER
STATE FOR EAP, PM/ISN
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5
USFK FOR J00/J01/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [MARR](#) [MNUC](#) [KN](#) [KS](#) [JA](#)
SUBJECT: PART 3 OF 4 -- ASD (APSA) GREGSON PARTICIPATES IN
JULY 16-17 U.S.-JAPAN-ROK DEFENSE TRILATERAL TALKS

REF: A. 08 SECDEF 8291
[1](#)B. TOKYO 1879
[1](#)C. TOKYO 1881

Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Please see Tokyo 1879 and 1881 for parts 1 and 2 of this cable.

[1](#)25. (S) To manage the situation, Takahashi continued, it will be necessary for the United States, Japan, and the ROK to disrupt the DPRK's nuclear endeavors, coordinate on responses to actions, and maintain clear defense postures for deterrence. It will especially be important to have a toolbox of measures to deploy should there be a sudden change in the situation, such as regime collapse, Takahashi asserted. He recommended the following as areas for trilateral cooperation: continuing the DTT; coordinating responses and sharing information on DPRK's missile development; sharing information to implement UNSCR 1874; sharing future scenarios; cooperating on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); and engaging in trilateral humanitarian and disaster relief (HA/DR), search and rescue, and counter-piracy exercises.

[1](#)26. (S) MOD DG Takamizawa commented that it will be important to respond appropriately to North Korean provocations. Calm responses might not always be the answer as they may signal to the DPRK that the United States, Japan, and the ROK are not taking Pyongyang's bait, hence emboldening the DPRK further. Takamizawa also noted that even if Japan did not pass the cargo inspection bill, due to the current domestic political situation, Japan could still legally take other action such as conducting surveillance flights and sharing information that would help implement UNSCR 1874.

¶27. (S) MOFA DDG Tomita said the overall goal is to resolve the North Korean issue by diplomatic means and that the Six-Party Talks and China's bilateral engagement with the DPRK should continue. He lamented, however, that these efforts have not changed the DPRK's behavior and that Kim Jong-il's failing health and a possible succession would put a diplomatic solution further out of reach. UN Security Council Resolutions are the most legal and powerful political weapons available to the international community for preventing the DPRK from becoming a nuclear state, Tomita continued. When the UNSC takes action, even nations like Libya, Sudan and Iran cannot consider the DPRK's actions legitimate. China, Tomita noted, will continue to pressure the DPRK to avoid becoming isolated in the UNSC. Beijing is pressed into action when it perceives possible instability on its borders or in the region that could disrupt its economic growth. While it is hard to simulate such instability, it is important that the United States, ROK, and Japan show China that the three countries are serious and have a firm resolve toward North Korea. Given Kim Jong-il's failing health and the possibility of instability in North Korea, perhaps it is time to deepen trilateral discussions on potential regime collapse scenarios for which the United States, Japan, and ROK would shoulder most of the response burden, Tomita offered.

Response to North Korea: U.S. Briefs

¶28. (S) DASD Schiffer provided DOD's perspective on the DPRK issue, underscoring North Korea's goal to become a nuclear weapons state and stressing the importance of a unified approach. Schiffer emphasized that, while many DPRK provocations are attributed to succession planning, some actions indicate that many events were planned well before the onset of Kim Jong-il's sickness. Nevertheless, to minimize risk and maximize opportunities in the situation, the United States, Japan, and ROK need to send non-escalatory signals to North Korea, institutionalize trilateral cooperation, amplify defense commitments, fully implement UNSCR 1874, and assure adequate preparedness for DPRK provocations.

¶29. (S) Elaborating on areas in need of cooperation, Lt Gen Rice discussed steps to enhance trilateral BMD cooperation. Rice explained the constraints imposed on BMD because information sharing occurs exclusively in bilateral U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK channels. More effective BMD is possible with trilateral information sharing, with significant benefits from shared knowledge and capabilities. Successful BMD information sharing, coordination response, and resource-sharing between the United States and Japan in the last three years demonstrate potential trilateral gains, Rice said.

¶30. (S) OSD Transnational Threat Policy Director Steven Schleien briefed on cooperative UNSCR 1874 implementation, elaborating on sovereign rights and operational aspects of UNSCR 1874. Schleien stressed that UNSCR 1874 differs from 1718 in allowing seizure and disposal of contraband and pointed out that nations have sovereign rights to inspect North Korean vessels in their territory and ports. Exercise of sovereign rights is not contingent on meeting reasonable conditions outlined in the resolution. The onus is on the DPRK to demonstrate compliance. By demonstrating a unified stance, the international community will convey global norms to the DPRK and signal that diplomacy is the only viable path, Schleien asserted.

¶31. (S) Embassy Tokyo Chargé d'Affaires, a.i. Ron Post provided a brief on strategic communications, outlining the essential role of coordinated public messaging in managing the North Korea situation. Post emphasized the need to include public communications in the planning stages to ensure appropriate public messages regarding DPRK provocations in different scenarios. Avoiding a crisis

atmosphere is important, as a panic-riddled environment limits maneuverability for states and reduces effectiveness in responses. Projection of coordinated preparation with Alliance partners via consistent public messaging is imperative, he asserted. Maintaining visible contact between leaders and counterparts in each country is productive, while publicly speculating potential outcomes of coordination between parties is not. When provocations occur during the daytime in Asia, absent immediate responses from Washington, the ROK and Japan, together with the resident U.S. Embassies, should maintain the official line, Post stressed.

132. (S) ASD Gregson characterized the three governments' response to date as strong, calm, and steady, and he noted that nobody is characterizing North Korean actions as a crisis. DASD Schiffer said the U.S. Government believes this is an inflection point where North Korea sought to become an ICBM-capable, nuclear weapons state. Noting the likelihood that future North Korean actions would involve the NLL and DMZ, Schiffer also advocated consideration of future provocations directed at Japan or Guam and incorporation of these scenarios into the trilateral dialogue. DM Kim agreed with DASD Schiffer's assessment and noted that it would be wise not to focus solely on threats directed at the ROK. PACOM J-5 Director MajGen Alles proposed a trilateral observation of a ballistic missile test shot scheduled for December 9 in Kauai to start a policy-level dialogue on furthering cooperation on information sharing. DG Takamizawa expressed support for the idea, adding there are other exercise observation opportunities as well, including the U.S. Navy SM-3 test shot in early 2010, as well as Nimble Titan. DM Kim stated that the ROK delegation would review the proposals positively upon return to Seoul.

Post-brief Discussions

133. (S) DM Kim summarized three main discussion points on implementing UNSCR 1874: 1) surveillance and interdiction; 2) information sharing; and 3) understanding of each country's legal restrictions. The three governments need to find effective means to cooperate on the first two items, to engage in trilateral table top exercises, and to work toward combining their respective regional activities. Responding to Takamizawa's query on ideas for moving forward, Kim explained that the ROK government is reviewing its national plan for implementing UNSCR 1874 to be presented at the UN Security Council on July 27. Under the plan, MOFAT leads interagency coordination and provides guidance on roles and missions specific to each government ministry and agency for implementation. The plan also provides for ROK observation of multinational training exercises, Kim added. DASD Schiffer suggested the DTT Working Group should, during its meeting in the fall, establish modalities for a UNSCR 1874 action group to report to next year's DTT. Both Kim and Takamizawa agreed to the idea.

134. (S) DASD Schiffer proposed convening a trilateral track-1 workshop on strategic communication, crisis response and management, to be hosted by the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). DG Takamizawa noted that he supports the U.S. proposal in principle, but added that ROK and Japanese ideas and thoughts ought to be incorporated into any workshop, as APCSS programs, while sophisticated, tend to be biased toward the U.S. perspective. He pointed out that such a workshop is, nevertheless, extremely useful, as strategic communication between the ROK and GOJ has been insufficient, leaving the United States to assume the intermediary role. Despite valiant efforts by Korean and Japanese Defense Attaches in both capitals, the Japanese government at times feel frustrated by the lack of communication even during the missile launches.

135. (S) ASD Gregson remarked that the APCSS should not be viewed as the exclusive venue and that the workshop could be hosted by Japan or Korea in any venue agreeable to all parties. DM Kim stated that the ROK delegation would review

the U.S. proposal and do its best to participate. He agreed that all three countries should institutionalize trilateral dialogue on strategic communication. He also expressed interest in promoting new channels of communication and re-invigorate existing channels at different levels of government among the DTT partners. As suggested by Takamizawa, all three parties should review the discussion materials and share each other's briefs prior to the APCSS workshop to allow productive discussion, Kim said.

National Defense Strategies: QDR

¶36. (S) DASD Schiffer outlined the QDR process and portrayed it as a balancing exercise between resources and efforts. Addressing current endeavors with an eye to future contingencies, DASD Schiffer stated that the QDR will address violent extremist movements, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, rising powers with sophisticated weapons, failed or failing states, and increased encroachment in the global commons (air, sea, space, cyberspace). Schiffer also noted that the QDR will, for the first time, incorporate non-traditional security challenges of climate change and energy security. DM Kim inquired about the extent to which the U.S. Government would solicit the opinions of its allies. DASD Schiffer replied that the QDR is an open process and that meetings with the QDR team can be arranged to address specific concerns from allied governments.

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National Defense Strategies: ROK Defense Reform
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¶37. (S) LTC Kim Dong-gyun presented ROK Defense Reform Basic Plan (DR 2020), focusing on both structural reform of the ROK military, as well as management reform. (Note: According to one U.S. delegation member, the content of DR 2020 was previously classified, demonstrating a new ROK government willingness to share sensitive information with Japan. End Note.) The ROK government, through DR 2020, seeks to strengthen Korea's defense capability by transforming the ROK military into a technology-driven military structure capable of dealing with comprehensive security threats. LTC Kim noted that while the original DR 2020 reduced troops to the 500,000 level, the revised DR 2020 pegged the number of troops at 517,000. Establishing a ground operation command and transforming the ROK Navy, Kim added, are priorities, as are increasing the ROK Air Force's tactical precision strike capability and integrating and relocating scattered units.
ZUMWALT